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displays parameter estimates for a variety of regression models relating defense spending preferences (measured on a scale running from -1 for respondents who wanted to "spend much less money for defense" to + 1 for respondents who felt that "defense spending should be greatly increased") to a series of explanatory variables measuring respondents' political and foreign policy attitudes. The explanatory variables in the first column of table 1 include general political ideology, attitudes toward Russia, willingness to use force, isolationism, and economic stakes in the Pentagon budget.3 To facilitate comparability, all of these variables (except economic stakes) are also recoded to vary between -1 and + 1. 4 The parameter estimates in the first column of table 1 indicate that each of these variables had a notable impact on defense spending preferences, with conservatives, isolationists, people who advocated a tough posture toward Russia during the Cold War, and people whose states were net beneficiaries from Pentagon spending favoring more Pentagon spending, other things being equal. However, the magnitudes of the various parameter estimates clearly suggest that the dominant factor in producing support for defense spending in 1992 was a general willingness "to use military force to solve international problems."
The remaining columns of table 1 display parameter estimates for a variety of alternative regression specifications in which the determinants of defense spending preferences included in the first column are omitted one at a time. The parameter estimates produced by these alternative specifications provide further evidence of the importance of willingness to use force; it is the dominant determinant of defense spending preferences in every specification, regardless of which other variables are included in the analysis. The estimated effect of attitudes toward Russia is also quite stable across specifications, albeit of much smaller magnitude, while the estimated effect of isolationism increases 3. The Appendix contains more detailed information about question wording, data, and estimation, including explanations of the "jackknifed instrumental variables" and "jackknifed auxiliary instrumental variables" parameter estimates and of the "selection bias" coefficients included in table 1 and subsequent tables. 4. Economic stakes in the defense establishment are measured by Pentagon spending in each respondent's state (minus federal tax revenues spent on defense) in thousands of dollars per capita. The measure was constructed from various editions of The Almanac of American Politics, which reports levels of Pentagon spending and total federal taxation by state and year. My estimate of each survey respondent's net economic stake in the Pentagon budget is based on total defense expenditures in the respondent's state (in thousands of 1990 dollars per capita) minus the tax burden attributable to defense (measured by the federal tax burden in the respondent's state, also in thousands of 1990 dollars per capita, multiplied by the fraction of total federal revenues spent on defense). To allow for dissemination of information about these economic stakes I used the data reported in the current edition of The Almanac of American Politics for each election year; e.g., survey respondents in the 1992 election study were matched with 1990 data reported in The Almanac of American Politics 1992. significantly when willingness to use force is omitted from the analysis (in the fourth column). The estimated effect of ideology is more variable, increasing significantly when toughness toward Russia or willingness to use force is omitted (in the third and fourth columns, respectively); these variations reflect the positive correlation between general political ideology and the more specific foreign policy attitudes that more directly determine defense spending preferences. On the other hand, omitting either conservative ideology or isolationism from the regression model reduces the apparent impact of the other (in the second and fifth columns). Significant contractions in the military establishment have put the local economic consequences of defense spending policies very much in the public spotlight in recent years, as evidenced, for example, by the attention attracted by the periodic deliberations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Since previous research has suggested that local economic costs and benefits significantly influenced both public opinion toward Pentagon spending and congressional support for the Reagan military buildup (Bartels 1991 a; Trubowitz and Roberts 1992), it would not be surprising to find similar effects in an era of significant declines in Pentagon spending. The parameter estimates in table 1 suggest that economic stakes did influence public opinion toward defense spending in 1992, but in a relatively modest way. Other things being equal, the expected difference in defense spending preferences between the biggest gainers from Pentagon spending (in Virginia, with a net gain of $1,433 per capita) and the biggest losers (in New Jersey, with a net loss of $1,329 per capita) amounted to only about .16-slightly less than the expected difference between strong conservatives and ideological moderates or between hard-liners and moderates on relations with Russia.
The Impact of the End of the Cold War on Defense Spending Preferences
The parameter estimates in before Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost (Oberdorfer 1991) . The 1982-84 baseline is especially convenient because, as figure 1 indicates, real defense outlays in this period were similar (in constant dollars) to the level of 1992; part of the mounting demand for reduced defense spending later in the 1980s reflected higher current levels of spending rather than lower desired levels (Bartels 1992). Choosing a longer Cold War baseline period produces some changes in the results of the analysis; these are documented in table 5 below.5 Figure 1 shows the trend of U.S. defense spending during the period covered by this analysis. The Reagan buildup of the early 1980s saw real increases in the Pentagon budget of more than 6 percent per year for 6 consecutive years, from less than $250 billion in fiscal year 1980 to almost $350 billion in fiscal year 1986. Real spending leveled off from fiscal year 1986 to fiscal year 1989, and then began to decline steadily. At the time of the 1992 survey (early in fiscal year 1993), real defense outlays had been declining by 5 percent per year for 4 consecutive years, and defense budget authority (also in real dollars) had been declining by more than 4 percent per year for 8 consecutive years (tables 3 and 4 in Kosiak [1993] The relative stability of the parameter estimates in table 2 over a decade-long period spanning significant changes in U.S. defense policy and momentous changes in the corresponding policy environment is very striking. Despite the complete disappearance of the Soviet Union, the sorts of respondents who were most likely to advocate a tough posture toward the Soviets during the Cold War remained noticeably more willing to spend money on defense in 1992. Conversely, the sorts it can to prevent the spread of communism to any other part of the world." (2) "The United States should do everything it can to check the spread of Soviet influence in the world." (3) "Communism may have its problems, but it is an acceptable form of government for some countries." (4) "Some people say that our government should try very hard to get along with Russia. Others say that it would be a mistake to try very hard to get along with Russia." of respondents who were most predisposed to use force in 1992 were already much more willing to spend money on defense in the early 1980s. In these and other respects, the structure of the public's defense spending preferences in 1992 remained frozen in the Cold War era. And although there was a statistically significant downward shift in the intercept level of defense spending preferences between 1984 and 1992, the magnitude of this shift does not seem very impressive by comparison with the historic decline in the external threat to U.S. security during the same period.
How are we to account for this remarkable stability in the structure of defense spending preferences? One possibility is that ordinary people were simply too uninformed or inattentive to grasp the implications of the collapse of communism for the underpinnings of U.S. defense spending policy, except in the simplest sense that a reduced foreign threat might allow for some modest reduction in the Pentagon budget. If this explanation is correct, it should be possible to discern significant changes in the structure of defense spending preferences among especially well informed citizens, but not among those who are relatively uninformed about politics and public affairs.'1 Before comparing changes in the structure of opinion among relatively uninformed and better-informed citizens, it may be useful to compare changes in the levels of aggregate defense spending preferences between the two groups over time." A comparison of this sort is presented in figure 2, which shows separate aggregate defense spending preferences, on the -1 to + 1 scale introduced previously, for the most informed and least informed respondents in each of the seven NES surveys conducted between 1980 and 1992.12 10. Converse (1962), Gamson and Modigliani (1966) , and many other analysts have documented the importance of political information in structuring attitude change. Zaller's (1992) treatment is especially comprehensive and insightful, while Sniderman's (1993) review essay is a good source of further references and discussion. 11. My measure of respondents' political information is based on interviewers' summary evaluations of respondents' "general level of information about politics and public affairs" at the end of the NES interview. Zaller's (1985) detailed analysis suggests that these summary evaluations are the "single most effective information item" in the NES surveys, with excellent statistical reliability (.78), strong correlations with a variety of relevant criterion variables, and no evidence of significant interviewer bias on the basis of respondents' race, income, education, or gender. 12. These estimates are derived from linear regressions of defense spending preferences on information (coded 1 for respondents with "very high" information levels, .75 for "fairly high" information, .5 for "average" information, .25 for "fairly low" information, and 0 for "very low" information), lack of information (with the coding of information simply reversed), and a selection bias correction described in the Appendix. Omitting the selection bias correction produces similar results, but with lower levels of apparent support for defense spending among both informed and uninformed respondents In one sense the trends in figure 2 are consistent with Page and Shapiro's (1992, chap. 7) hypothesis of "parallel publics": in five of the six pairs of adjacent surveys, the direction of aggregate opinion change among uninformed respondents was in the same direction as among fully informed respondents. However, in every case the changes in aggregate opinion from one survey to the next were smaller among uninformed respondents; the total change averaged across the pairs of adjacent surveys was only half as large. This pattern seems consistent with the idea that relatively uninformed respondents were significantly less responsive than better-informed respondents to the implications of changing political and strategic circumstances for appropriate levels of Pentagon spending.
The analyses presented in tables 3 and 4 extend the comparison between relatively well informed and relatively uninformed respondents from preference levels to preference structures of the sort examined in tables 1 and 2. For example, table 3 presents parameter estimates paralleling those presented in table 2, but only for the one-third or so of the general public most informed about politics and public errors of the individual estimates in fig. 2 are .027 for informed preferences and .043 for uninformed preferences. affairs."3 This is the stratum of the public in which post-Cold War structural change should be evident, if it is evident at all. The implication of the parameter estimates in table 3 could hardly be clearer: here, at last, is evidence of very marked changes in the structure of defense spending preferences in the post-Cold War era.
13. Respondents whose level of political information was very high or fairly high are classified here as "high information" respondents; those with average, fairly low, or very low levels of information are classified as "low information" respondents. In most of the NES surveys the former group is about 40 percent of the total sample and the latter group about 60 percent; in 1992 the proportion of high-information respondents was somewhat higher, presumably because half the 1992 respondents had survived previous NES interviews.
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Larry M. Bartels A comparison of the 1992 parameter estimates presented in the second column of the table with the Cold War era estimates presented in the first column indicates that the effects of ideology, attitudes toward Russia, and isolationism had virtually disappeared by 1992 among this well-informed stratum of the public, while the effect of willingness to use force nearly tripled and the intercept level of defense spending preferences declined by more than half a point on the -1 to + 1 scale. It could be argued that these marked changes in the structure of defense spending preferences reflect sensible appraisals of how the world has changed with the end of the Cold War. It does not seem surprising that the collapse of communism has dissolved the conventional Cold War linkage between conservative ideology and defense Post-Cold War Defense Spending Preferences 491 spending preferences.14 Nor does it seem odd that isolationists, who may have regarded an expensive military establishment as the price of U.S. security from foreign interference during the Cold War, are no longer willing to pay that price in an era when American military might seems less likely to be used for defense against Soviet aggression than for projecting American influence around the globe. And, conversely, the increasing centrality of willingness to use force in the structure of defense spending preferences seems consistent with the increasingly proactive character of U.S. efforts to "use military force to solve international problems" (as the NES survey item has it) in what President Bush trumpeted as the "new world order."
Of course, attentive citizens need not have worked out for themselves these policy implications of global change; simply watching and listening to political elites would have provided significant clues about how dramatic world events had altered the traditional bases of defense spending preferences. For example, the defense budget reductions projected and implemented by the conservative Bush administration, the militant conservative isolationism of Patrick Buchanan's "America First" campaign, and the ideological heterogeneity of the coalitions supporting and opposing the use of force in the Persian Gulf were clear indications that the Cold War equation of conservatism and internationalism with support for the Pentagon, and liberalism and isolationism with opposition to defense spending, were no longer applicable."5
What seems more surprising is that there is almost no trace of parallel changes in the structure of defense spending preferences among the 60 percent or so of the public that is less informed about politics and public affairs. None of the changes evident in the best-informed 40 percent of the public are evident in this less informed stratum. Indeed, as the parameter estimates in table 4 indicate, the changes for which there is some (weak) evidence in the less informed public are often in the opposite direction. Attitudes toward Russia, isolationism, and economic stakes were, if anything, probably more important in 1992 than during the Cold War among the relatively uninformed, while the declining impact of ideology and the increasing impact of willingness to use force were both much smaller in magnitude than among the relatively well informed (and far from attaining conventional statistical significance). The intercept level of defense spending preferences among the relatively uninformed was essentially the same in 1992 as in 1984, suggesting that even the one significant change evident in the whole public in table 2 was attributable almost entirely to a change in the preferences of the relatively well-informed stratum of the public.
The absence of systematic change in the structure of less informed opinions persists even if we allow for the possibility that less informed people were slower to recognize fundamental changes in the Cold War environment. Table 5 era pattern for less informed respondents more than it does either the Cold War or contemporary pattern among better-informed respondents. These comparisons reinforce graphically the conclusion that, at least with respect to defense spending policy, most of the American public has not yet come to grips with the end of the Cold War.
The Determinants of Willingness to Use Force
The " (1992, p. 453) . The important point is that these changing perceptions of the Soviet Union were apparently not sufficient to precipitate significant restructuring of related policy preferences, even for the rather proximate issues of demographic patterns are similar in a few respects to those reported in table Al for willingness to use force, but not so similar as to suggest that the effects of trust and symbolic patriotism in table 6 are merely artifacts of demographic similarities. 22. Wittkopf (1993) presents a broader but generally consistent interpretation of the public's foreign policy views. containing communism and defense spending.23 Thus, only the more informed stratum of the general public has so far succeeded in grasping-either directly or by attending to the arguments of political elites-the implications for U.S. defense policy of the declining Soviet threat.
If the significant changes observed in the most informed stratum of the general public are harbingers of future changes in the public at large, the analysis presented here provides some interesting indications of how the structure of defense spending preferences will change in the years to come: declining demand for defense spending among the general public will continue to produce downward pressure on the Pentagon budget in the post-Cold War era, and remaining differences in defense spending preferences will increasingly come to reflect fundamental differences regarding the use of force in the international arena, while general political ideology, anticommunism, and isolationism will become less significant bases of defense policy conflict. It is worth reiterating, however, that my analysis has produced no evidence that such across-the-board changes in the structure of support for defense spending are already underway outside the most informed stratum of the general public.
The remarkable inertia in the defense spending preferences of much of the American public in the post-Cold War era may provide one explanation for the similarly remarkable inertia in actual defense policy in the last decade. Numerous observers, analysts, and editorialists have emphasized how slowly and haltingly the Pentagon has responded to momentous changes in the global political and military situation, despite the significant changes in overall spending levels documented in figure 1 (e.g., Morrison 1985; Kaufmann 1992, p. vii; Gordon 1993; New York Times 1994). One reporter described policymakers "floating in a Cold War-era time capsule while the currents of a new world order swirl outside" (Schmitt 1991). Another noted that "a huge peace dividend anticipated by many at the end of the cold war has not materialized. Instead, small reductions in spending have been achieved incrementally by cutting troop strength and dropping plans for a few major weapons" (Weiner 1994 ).
This policy inertia is presumably attributable in part to inertia in the attitudes and perceptions even of political elites (Murray 1993) The resulting missing data make it impossible to estimate the relative effects of toughness toward Russia, willingness to use force, and isolationism on defense spending preferences directly in any of the seven election studies since 1980. Nevertheless, the fact that similar batteries of demographic variables were included in each election study makes it possible to simulate responses to the questions on Russia, force, and isolationism on the basis of auxiliary instrumental variables estimation (Franklin 1990 ). Essentially, predicted responses for each question based on auxiliary "purging" regressions can be substituted for actual responses as explanatory variables in an analysis of defense spending preferences, even in years when no actual responses are available. Table Al presents is understated by more than 70 percent when no account is taken of measurement error. The impact of isolationism is also somewhat understated, while the impact of attitudes toward Russia is overstated.29 As a result, the increased importance of willingness to use force in the post-Cold War era is entirely obscured in the ordinary least squares analysis, and the changes in the effects of the other variables in tables 3 and 4 are understated by about 50 percent.
The models for which results are reported in tables 1-5 include one further defense against bias: the inclusion in the relevant regressions of a variable intended to capture the effect of selection bias due to nonrandom nonresponse. Almost 15 percent of the respondents in the various NES surveys declined to place themselves on the defense spending scale, fastening upon the response option "or haven't you thought much about this?" in the survey question. To guard against bias in the parameter estimates due to this sample truncation, the regressions reported in tables 1-5 include a selection bias coefficient measuring the correlation between the unmeasured causes of defense spending preferences and response probabilities (Heckman 1979; Achen 1986 ).3
These estimated selection biases are mostly negative, especially during the Cold War period. This pattern suggests that the unmeasured characteristics predisposing survey respondents to place themselves on the NES defense spending scale made them less supportive of defense spending, other things of the relevant surveys: toughness toward Russia, isolationism, and (in the Cold War period only) willingness to use force. 29. It is important to recall here that biases due to measurement error generally affect all of the parameter estimates in an equation, not just those associated with the variable or variables measured with error. It is also important to recall that, except in the simplest bivariate case, measurement error may produce either attenuation or inflation of parameter estimates; it is not uncommon to find the parameter estimates for some (especially error-laden) variables biased toward zero and those for other (usually more reliably measured) variables biased upward in magnitude (Achen 1983 ). Here, even though the impact of attitudes toward Russia is necessarily estimated with the equivalent of an instrumental variable, since these attitudes were not measured in the 1992 survey, the parameter estimate appears to be biased upward by measurement error in the other explanatory variables. 30. The selection bias correction is omitted from table 6 because the nonresponse rate for the "willingness to use force" variable analyzed there was only about 2 percent. 2 ). This implication of the selection bias coefficients is not especially surprising, given that respondents who decline to place themselves on issue scales tend to be relatively less educated and less informed about politics: less educated respondents were shown in table Al to be tougher toward Russia, more willing to use force, and more isolationist than bettereducated respondents, while less informed respondents were shown in figure 2 to prefer more defense spending than more informed respondents did in each of the seven NES surveys. The effect of correcting for this apparent selection bias on the other parameter estimates in the analysis is suggested by comparing the parameter estimates in tables 2-4 with those in table A3, which presents parallel results from analyses in which the correction for selection bias is omitted. The apparent effects of ideology and willingness to use force are generally exaggerated in table A3 by comparison with those in tables 2-4, while the apparent effects of isolationism and toughness toward Russia are generally understated. The parameter estimates in table A3 show virtually no change over time in the effect of isolationism among well-informed respondents, whereas the corresponding estimate in table 3 was strongly negative. In most respects, however, the pattern of changes in the structure of defense spending preferences implied by the parameter estimates in table A3 is similar to the pattern found in tables 2_4.31 31. The three changes in table 2 that are larger in magnitude than their standard errors are in the same direction and still larger than their standard errors without the correction for selection bias. All but one of the changes for relatively well-informed respondents in table 3 are in the same direction without the correction for selection bias, although some that were statistically significant in table 3 are insignificant in table A3. (The estimated change in the effect of isolationism is strongly negative in table 3 but slightly, albeit insignificantly, positive in table A3.) All of the changes for relatively uninformed respondents in table 4 are in the same direction without the correction for selection bias, and several are larger in magnitude than their standard errors (though none has a t-statistic larger in absolute value than 1.61, for ideology).
